

**AL QUDS, AL MUALAMEEN, AND  
AL FAOO SCHOOLS  
UNDER THE IRAQ-COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY  
RESPONSE PROGRAM  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ**

**SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT**

**SIGIR PA-08-149  
SIGIR PA-08-150  
SIGIR PA-08-151  
OCTOBER 29, 2008**

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# SIGIR

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction

October 29, 2008

**Reports: PA-08-149 to 08-151**

## Why SIGIR Did This Study

SIGIR is charged to conduct assessments of Iraq reconstruction projects funded with amounts appropriated or made available for the reconstruction of Iraq. SIGIR is assessing projects funded by the Government of Iraq under the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Program (I-CERP) to provide real-time relief and reconstruction information to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted. I-CERP funds are Development Fund for Iraq monies transferred to the U.S. for disbursement and administration. The objective of these three project assessments was to determine whether the projects were operating at the capacity stated in the original contracts. To accomplish this objective, SIGIR determined if the projects, all funded under I-CERP, were at full capability or capacity when accepted by the government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspection on September 17, 2008.

## What SIGIR Recommends

SIGIR recommends that the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Commander, 926<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade initiate another contract to complete the school refurbishments, particularly portions of the contracts that present safety issues; ensure future contracts identify the work and the specifications; and comply with the provisions of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Handbook, "Money as a Weapon System".

SIGIR received informal comments on a draft of this report from the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, advising that the Multi-National Forces-Iraq concurred with the report's findings and recommendations. SIGIR appreciates the concurrence by the Multi-National Forces-Iraq with the draft report's recommendations

*For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at (703) 428-1100 or [PublicAffairs@sigir.mil](mailto:PublicAffairs@sigir.mil)*

## Sadr City Schools

### What SIGIR Found

On September 17, 2008, SIGIR performed an on-site assessment of three Sadr City schools (Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo). The contract costs were \$419,700, \$389,200, and \$441,000 respectively. When SIGIR visited these sites, the refurbishment projects, although scheduled for completion on 29 July 2008, were still incomplete and had not been turned over to the Government of Iraq.

The overall objective of the projects was to rehabilitate the three schools, located in Sadr City's, Jamilla neighborhood in Baghdad, Iraq, to benefit approximately 1200 students. The objective of these project assessments was to determine whether the projects were operating at the capacity stated in the original contract.

During the site visit, SIGIR observed that a majority of the Statement of Work requirements for the refurbishment of the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools appeared to be complete. However, a number of contractual items were still incomplete. For example, the electrical panel area was not secured and debris and old furniture, which were to be removed, were still on site. The condition of the electrical panel created a risk of electrical shock and fire, and the debris and discarded furniture presented a hazard to students and faculty.

The contract specified that the quality of work must meet the Iraqi Ministry of Education standards. However, the contract did not identify the standards to which work was to be performed or the quality of materials to be used. Neither the Multi-National Corps-Iraq nor the 926<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade was able to obtain the Iraqi Ministry of Education standards. Although the contract terms provided sufficient identification of the work to be performed, the specifications to which the work was to be performed were not adequate.

Multi-National Corps-Iraq representatives reported that the local Iraqi contractor requested to be released from the contracts because he stated that he had received multiple solicitations from Government of Iraq representatives for bribes. The contracts were closed and partial payments were made to the contractor for work completed. Multi-National Corps-Iraq reports that attempts were underway to obtain another contractor to complete the refurbishments. Also, neither the Multi-National Corps-Iraq nor the 926<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade could provide the required bi-weekly reports or status reports describing the site progress during construction.





## **SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION**

October 29, 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, UNITED STATES CENTRAL  
COMMAND  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCES-  
IRAQ  
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-  
IRAQ  
COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING  
COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN  
COMMANDER, GULF REGION DIVISION, U.S. ARMY  
CORPS OF ENGINEERS  
DIRECTOR, IRAQ TRANSITION ASSISTANCE OFFICE

SUBJECT: Report on Refurbishment of the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Fao School in Sadr City's Jamilla neighborhood in Baghdad, Iraq (Report Numbers SIGIR PA-08-149, PA-08-150, and PA-08-151)

We are providing this report for your information and use. It addresses the current status of the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Fao Schools in the Sadr City district of the city of Baghdad, Iraq. The assessment was made to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract.

We received informal comments on a draft of this report from the Multi-National Forces-Iraq concurring with the report's findings and recommendations.

We request that management provide formal comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, please send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil). Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature.

We thank the 3<sup>rd</sup> Brigade Combat Team of the 4<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division for assistance in coordinating the visit to the three Sadr City Schools.

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Brian Flynn at DSN 318-343-9244 or via e-mail at [brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil). For public affairs queries concerning this report, please contact SIGIR Public Affairs at [publicaffairs@sigir.mil](mailto:publicaffairs@sigir.mil) or at 703-428-1100.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.  
Inspector General

## **Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**

**SIGIR-PA-08-149**

**October 29, 2008**

**SIGIR-PA-08-150**

**SIGIR-PA-08-151**

### **Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools Under the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program Baghdad, Iraq**

#### **Synopsis**

**Introduction.** The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is assessing projects funded by the Government of Iraq under the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program to provide real-time relief and reconstruction information to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted.

**Project Assessment Objectives.** The objective of these project assessments was to determine whether the projects were operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish the objective, the assessment team sought to determine whether the projects were at full capability or capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspections on 17 September 2008. SIGIR conducted these limited scope assessments in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team comprised an engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

The overall objective of the projects was to rehabilitate the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools, in Sadr City's Jamilla neighborhood in Baghdad, Iraq, to benefit approximately 350 to 400 students at each of the three schools. On 29 June 2008, firm-fixed-price contracts were awarded to a local contractor. The Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools rehabilitation projects were scheduled for completion on 29 July 2008.

**Conclusions.** At the time of the SIGIR site visit on 17 September 2008, the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools refurbishment projects were incomplete. Multi-National Corps-Iraq representatives reported that the local Iraqi contractor requested to be released from the contracts because he had received multiple solicitations for bribes from Government of Iraq representatives. The Iraqi contractor stated that he refused to make the bribe payments and had received threats against himself, his colleagues, and his family. Multi-National Corps-Iraq representatives reported that Coalition forces closed the contracts and made partial payments to the contractor for work completed at the time the projects were closed out. Multi-National Corps-Iraq reports that attempts were underway to obtain another contractor to complete the refurbishments.

During the site visits, SIGIR observed that a majority of the Statement of Work requirements for the refurbishment of the three schools appeared to be complete. However, a number of contractual items were incomplete; for example the electrical panel area was not secured, and debris and furniture that were to be removed were still on site. The condition of the electrical panel created a risk of electrical shock and fire, and the debris and discarded furniture presented an unsafe condition.

The contracts' Statements of Work sufficiently identified the portions of the schools to be refurbished--specifically the school areas, equipment, and facilities to be installed or replaced. Also, provisions were included that required that materials and equipment would be replaced with new equipment, not used equipment. The contract terms also specified that the quality of work must meet the standards of the Iraqi Ministry of Education. Other than that, the contract terms did not identify the standards to which work was to be performed or the quality of materials to be used. Neither the Multi-National Corps-Iraq nor the 926<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade was able to obtain the Iraqi Ministry of Education standards. Consequently, although the contract terms provided sufficient identification of the work to be performed, the specifications to which the work was to be performed were not adequate.

Established and funded by the Government of Iraq, the purpose of the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program is to enable commanders to execute urgently needed reconstruction projects for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The Multi-National Corps-Iraq Standard Operating Procedure Handbook, "Money as a Weapons System", which prescribes guidance for the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program, provides that the overall success of the program's reporting is based on checks and balances and Government of Iraq oversight of the program, which requires bi-weekly reports of projects to be submitted to the Government of Iraq for review. The guidance also requires that project data in the Iraq Reconstruction Management Systems be accurate and updated weekly to ensure synchronization of projects among the Government of Iraq ministries.

Documentation provided to the assessment team summarized the financial and contractual start of the project. However, neither the Multi-National Corps-Iraq nor 926<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade provided bi-weekly reports or status reports describing the site progress during construction.

**Recommendations.** SIGIR recommends that the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Commander, 926th Engineer Brigade take these actions:

1. Initiate another contract to complete the school refurbishments, particularly portions of the contracts that present safety issues such as the electrical panel, which presents a risk of electrical shock and fire, and the debris and discarded furniture, which present an unsafe condition. In addition, the warranty, which is no longer valid from the original contractor, should be addressed, as well as incomplete items from the original contracts such as the missing window screens, inoperable air conditioning units, undelivered school supplies, etc.
2. Ensure that future contracts for the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program not only identify the work to be performed, but also the specifications to which the work is to be performed.
3. Comply with the provisions of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Handbook, "Money as a Weapons System", specifically: submit bi-weekly reports of projects for Government of Iraq review, and update project data in the Iraq Reconstruction Management System on a weekly basis to ensure synchronization of projects among the Government of Iraq ministries.

**Management Comments.** SIGIR received informal comments on a draft of this report from the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, advising that the Multi-National Forces-Iraq concurred with the report's findings and recommendations.

**Evaluation of Management Comments.** SIGIR appreciates the informal concurrence by the Multi-National Forces-Iraq with the draft report's recommendations. However, SIGIR requests that management provide formal comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, please send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil). Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature.

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# **Introduction**

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## **Objective of the Project Assessment**

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is assessing projects funded by the Government of Iraq (GOI) under the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program (I-CERP) to provide real-time relief and reconstruction information to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted. The objective of this project assessment was to determine whether the project was operating at the capacity stated in the original contract. To accomplish the objective, we determined if the project was at full capability or capacity when accepted by the U.S. government, when transferred to Iraqi operators, and during the site inspections on 17 September 2008.

I-CERP is a U.S. administered emergency response fund intended to engage provincial-level officials in planning, coordinating, prioritizing, and transitioning projects that are paid for by the GOI. Established and funded by the GOI in April 2008 with an expressed project focus on schools, water-purification plants, health clinics, city planning facilities, roads, sewers, and irrigation, the I-CERP leverages Coalition tactical resources in the field and U.S. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) mechanisms to expeditiously direct resources to projects that benefit the people of Iraq.

The allocation of I-CERP is conditioned on provincial population and project status is reviewed quarterly in concert with the Iraq Supreme Reconstruction Council. Projects are intended to serve as a training opportunity for affiliated Iraqi personnel with the expectation that the program will be transitioned to the Iraqi Security Forces and provincial officials.

## **Pre-Site Assessment Background**

### **Contract, Costs and Payments**

The Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools' refurbishment Notices to Proceed were awarded on 29 June 2008 to a local contractor. The contracts were firm-fixed price contracts for the net amounts of \$419,700; \$389,200; and \$441,000, respectively. In addition, the contracts were to be completed by 29 July 2008.

### **Statement of Work**

The Statements of Work (SOW) were for the refurbishment of existing architectural features, plumbing, and mechanical and electrical systems for the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools. The SOW will involve, but not be limited to, the following:

- renovation of all classrooms and bathrooms
- provide and install electricity from the national power grid
- replace and repair damaged doors
- replace broken glass in broken windows and provide and install Air Conditioning units
- provide a 35 kilovolt amps (kVa) generator for backup power

- renovate and repair the wall surrounding the school and paint the interior and exterior of school

### **Project Objective, Pre-Construction Description**

The description of the facility (pre-construction) was based on information obtained from the contract and the Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I) project file. The overall objective of the project was to rehabilitate the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools, located in Sadr City, Jamilla municipality in the Baghdad province. The Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools will benefit approximately 350 to 400 students at each school.

Before the refurbishment project, the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools were in major disrepair from years of neglect and a failure to maintain adequate upkeep. The schools needed refurbishment to allow the students in the neighborhood a safe and suitable classroom environment.

The project will employ approximately 55 laborers from the local area to refurbish the schools.

### **Project Design**

While the contract terms sufficiently identified the work to be performed, the specifications to which the work was to be performed were not adequate. The contracts' SOW included specific requirements and stated that materials and equipment will be replaced with new equipment, not used, and the quality of work must meet the Iraqi Ministry of Education standards. However, the design and construction standards for this project did not identify material type, quality, or commercial standards, and MNC-I was unable to obtain the Iraqi Ministry of Education standards. Typical specifications for a project of this type would include:

- type, quality, and installation of any finish materials (i.e. paint, tile, roofing, etc.)
- required capacity, output, and wiring requirements for air conditioning units
- wiring requirements for generators, including all transfer items and disconnects to safely connect the generator to the schools system while supplementing a connection from the national power grid
- performance requirements for all computers and electronics
- schematics of all electrical and communication wiring to be installed including wire gage, wire and junction location, conduit size, distribution panel and individual circuit capacity, and service size
- quality and style of all plumbing fixtures

## **Site Progress During Construction**


The purpose of the I-CERP program is to enable commanders to execute urgently needed reconstruction projects for the benefit of the Iraqi people using Iraqi funds. The Multi-National Corps-Iraq Standard Operating Procedure Handbook, "Money as a Weapons System," which prescribes guidance for the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program, states that the overall success of I-CERP reporting is based on checks and balances; and that Government of Iraq oversight of the I-CERP will be accomplished through the review of bi-weekly project reports. The project data must be kept accurate in the Iraq Reconstruction Management System and updated on a weekly basis to ensure synchronization of projects among the applicable GOI ministries. Monthly reports to the

C7 (Engineering Section) and C8 (Comptroller Section) on program execution will follow the same processes and meet the same requirements currently used for the Commander's Emergency Response Program.

MNC-I provided the following information for the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Fao School projects: bill of quantities, staffing forms, legal review documents, purchase requests and commitments, notices to proceed, refurbishment justifications, sole source justifications, terms of agreements, scopes of work, project locations, photographs, and the project coordination agreements in Arabic for the SIGIR assessment team's review.

The documentation provided encapsulated the financial and contractual commencement of the projects. However, the documentation did not cover the construction of the projects. The projects documentation did not contain bi-weekly reports or status reports describing the sites progress during construction. In addition, the photographs documented a limited range of on-going construction activities at the three schools. For example, Site Photo 1 shows the contractor plastering the exterior of the Al Quds School building. The contractor is painting the exterior of the reception building in Site Photo 2, repairing the roof in Site Photo 3, and reworking the electrical lines and installing interior fans in Site Photo 4.

As SIGIR was in the process of preparing the draft report, MNC-I representatives reported that the local Iraqi contractor had requested to be released from the contracts. While rehabilitating the schools, the contractor stated that he had received multiple solicitations from GOI representatives for bribes. When the contractor refused to make the bribe payments, he stated that he received threats against himself, his colleagues, and his family. Multi-National Corps-Iraq representatives reported that Coalition forces closed the contracts and made partial payments to the contractor for work completed at the time the projects were closed out. MNC-1 reported that attempts were underway to obtain another contractor to complete the refurbishments.



**Site Photo 1. Exterior plastering at Al Quds (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**



**Site Photo 2. Exterior painting at Al Quds (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**



**Site Photo 3. Repairing the roof at Al Quds (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**





**Site Photo 4. Reworking electrical lines & installing fan at Al Quds (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**

The Al Mualameen School photographs show the plastering of the wall (Site Photo 5) and the painting of the exterior wall surrounding (Site Photo 6).



**Site Photo 5. Plastering the wall at Al Mualameen (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**



**Site Photo 6. Repairing the wall at Al Mualameen (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**

Al Faoo School photographs show plastering of the exterior wall surrounding the school (Site Photo 7), and the plastering and painting of the Al Faoo School's exterior (Site Photo 8).



**Site Photo 7. Repairing wall at the Al Faoo school (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**



**Site Photo 8. Plastering and painting the Al Faoo school exterior (Photo courtesy of MNC-I)**

### Warranties

The contract stated that contractor would provide a one-year guarantee on all work specified in the contract. In addition, the contractor is required to respond to warranty requests within 30 days of being notified. If the contractor cannot make the repairs within the 30 day period, the contractor is required to provide details as to why the repairs cannot be made and the date when the contractor will make them. However, the contractor is not required to repair any item damaged from neglect or misuse.

## **Site Assessment**

On 17 September 2008, the SIGIR assessment team performed an on-site assessment that lasted approximately 40 minutes each at the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools. SIGIR was accompanied by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Gulf Region Central Officer in Charge. However, no representative from MNC-I accompanied the SIGIR assessment team to the sites.

The Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools refurbishment Notices to Proceed were awarded on 29 June 2008, and the refurbishments of the schools were to be completed by 29 July 2008. SIGIR visited the schools on 17 September 2008, and the projects were not completed or turned over to the Iraqis. According to purchase request documents: Al Quds, dated 21 August 2008, was 88% complete; Al Mualameen, dated 17 August 2008, was 90% complete; and Al Faoo, dated 21 August 2008, was 96% complete.

During the site visit, SIGIR observed that a majority of the SOW requirements for the refurbishment of the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools appeared to be complete. At the time of the site visit, the schools were closed for Ramadan holidays, and the contractor was not on site.





**Site Photo 9. Al Quds School sign**

The contractor installed exterior signs for the schools (Al Quds--Site Photo 9, Al Mualameen--Site Photo 10, and Al Faoo--Site Photo 11). The exterior of the schools (Al Quds--Site Photo 12, Al Mualameen--Site Photo 13, and Al Faoo--Site Photo 14) and the interior of the schools (Al Quds--Site Photo 15, Al Mualameen--Site Photo 16, and Al Faoo--Site Photo 17) were painted. The contractor installed generators (Al Quds--Site Photo 18, Al Mualameen--Site Photo 19, and Al Faoo--Site Photo 20) for backup power, and the generators' labels identified the generators as 35-kVa (Al Quds--Site Photo 21, Al Mualameen--Site Photo 22, and Al Faoo--Site Photo 23).



**Site Photo 10. Al Mualameen School sign**





**Site Photo 11. Al Faoo School sign**



**Site Photo 12. Painted exterior (Al Quds)**



**Site Photo 15. Painted interior (Al Quds)**



**Site Photo 13. Painted exterior (Al Mualameen)**



**Site Photo 16. Painted interior (Al Mualameen)**




Site Photo 14. Painted exterior (Al Faao)



Site Photo 17. Painted interior (Al Faao)




Site Photo 18. Generator (Al Quds)



Site Photo 21. Generator ID (Al Quds)



Site Photo 19. Generator (Al Mualameen)



Site Photo 22. Generator ID (Al Mualameen)





**Site Photo 20. Generator (Al Faoo)**



**Site Photo 23. Generator ID (Al Faoo)**


The classrooms were renovated, and the doors were replaced or repaired. Also, the contractor provided desks (Al Mualameen--Site Photo 24 and Al Faoo--Site Photo 25), whiteboards (Al Faoo--Site Photo 26), and computers (Al Quds--Site Photo 27, Al Mualameen--Site Photo 28, and Al Faoo--Site Photo 29) for the schools.



**Site Photo 24. Desks (Al Mualameen)**



**Site Photo 25. Desks (Al Faoo)**



Site Photo 26. Whiteboard (Al Faoo)



Site Photo 27. Computer room (Al Quds)



Site Photo 28. Computer room (Al Mualameen)



**Site Photo 29. Computer room (Al Faoo)**

The contractor repaired the caretaker building (Site Photo 30), and the exterior fence and gate of the school (Site Photo 31).



**Site Photo 30. Caretaker building (Al Faoo)**




**Site Photo 31. Exterior fence and gate (Al Faoo)**



The SIGIR inspectors found that the school rehabilitations were near completion. However, not all the screens were installed in the school windows (Site Photo 32). Some of the air conditioners were not working properly. The electrical panel was not located in a secure area inaccessible to the students and all electrical wiring was not in conduits (Site Photo 33). Also, there was no evidence that the school supplies had been provided.



**Site Photo 32. No screens in windows (Al Quds)**



**Site Photo 33. Electric breakers (Al Quds)**


In the Al Faoo School, the contractor installed the electrical switches and thermostat controls properly (Site Photo 34). There was evidence of poor quality electrical installation by the contractor (Site Photo 35) and an improper electrical connection (Site Photo 36) at the Al Mualameen School. The contractor needs to rewire the connections to the proper power supply.



**Site Photo 34. Proper electrical installation (Al Faoo)**  
**(Note: Paint not fully applied to side of electrical box).**



**Site Photo 35. Poor electrical installation  
(Al Mualameen)**



**Site Photo 36. Improper electrical connection  
(Al Mualameen)**

The school grounds were not being maintained and a recent sand storm had created a blanket of sand/dust on most surfaces. Also, debris and old furniture were present on the school grounds (Site Photo 37). The debris (Site Photo 38) and old furniture left on the site is a hazard to students and should be removed. If the school wishes to keep some of the old desks for replacement, the desks should be stored properly.



**Site Photo 37. Old furniture and debris (Al Quds)**





**Site Photo 38. Site debris (Al Quds)**

The new contractor will need to remove the old desks left in the schoolroom (Site Photo 39) and repair the broken steps (Site Photo 40).



**Site Photo 39. Broken desks (Al Mualameen)**



**Site Photo 40. Broken stairs (Al Mualameen)**

In addition, the new contractor will need to clean the exterior debris (Site Photo 41) and complete refurbishing the second floor of the Al Faoo School, which had discarded books scattered throughout the classrooms (Site Photo 42), broken desks throughout the classrooms (Site Photo 43), and miscellaneous debris in the school rooms (Site Photo 44).



**Site Photo 41. Exterior debris (Al Faoo)**



**Site Photo 42. Discarded books (Al Faoo)**



**Site Photo 43. Broken desks (Al Faoo)**



**Site Photo 44. Unfinished 2<sup>nd</sup> floor (Al Faoo)**

## Conclusions

At the time of the SIGIR site visit on 17 September 2008, the Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools refurbishment projects were incomplete. Multi-National Corps-Iraq representatives reported that the local Iraqi contractor requested to be released from the contracts because he had received multiple solicitations for bribes from Government of Iraq representatives. The Iraqi contractor stated that he refused to make the bribe payments and had received threats against himself, his colleagues, and his family. Multi-National Corps-Iraq representatives reported that Coalition forces closed the contracts and made partial payments to the contractor for work completed at the time the projects were closed out. Multi-National Corps-Iraq reports that attempts were underway to obtain another contractor to complete the refurbishments.

During the site visits, SIGIR observed that a majority of the Statement of Work requirements for the refurbishment of the three schools appeared to be complete. However, a number of contractual items were incomplete; for example the electrical panel area was not secured, and debris and furniture that were to be removed were still on site. The condition of the electrical panel created a risk of electrical shock and fire, and the debris and discarded furniture presented an unsafe condition.

The contracts' Statements of Work sufficiently identified the portions of the schools to be refurbished--specifically the school areas, equipment, and facilities to be installed or replaced. Also, provisions were included that required that materials and equipment would be replaced with new equipment, not used equipment. The contract terms also specified that the quality of work must meet the standards of the Iraqi Ministry of Education. Other than that, the contract terms did not identify the standards to which work was to be performed or the quality of materials to be used. Neither the Multi-National Corps-Iraq nor the 926<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade was able to obtain the Iraqi Ministry of Education standards. Consequently, although the contract terms provided sufficient identification of the work to be performed, the specifications to which the work was to be performed were not adequate.

Established and funded by the Government of Iraq, the purpose of the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program is to enable commanders to execute urgently needed reconstruction projects for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The Multi-National Corps-Iraq Standard Operating Procedure Handbook, "Money as a Weapons System", which prescribes guidance for the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program, provides that the overall success of the program's reporting is based on checks and balances and Government of Iraq oversight of the program, which requires bi-weekly reports of projects to be submitted to the Government of Iraq for review. The guidance also requires that project data in the Iraq Reconstruction Management Systems be accurate and updated weekly to ensure synchronization of projects among the Government of Iraq ministries.

Documentation provided to the assessment team summarized the financial and contractual start of the project. However, neither the Multi-National Corps-Iraq nor 926<sup>th</sup> Engineer Brigade provided bi-weekly reports or status reports describing the site progress during construction.

## **Recommendations**

SIGIR recommends that the Commander, Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Commander, 926th Engineer Brigade take these actions:

1. Initiate another contract to complete the school refurbishments, particularly portions of the contracts that present safety issues such as the electrical panel, which presents a risk of electrical shock and fire, and the debris and discarded furniture, which present an unsafe condition. In addition, the warranty, which is no longer valid from the original contractor, should be addressed, as well as incomplete items from the original contracts such as the missing window screens, inoperable air conditioning units, undelivered school supplies, etc.
2. Ensure that future contracts for the Iraq-Commander's Emergency Response Program not only identify the work to be performed, but also the specifications to which the work is to be performed.
3. Comply with the provisions of the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Handbook, "Money as a Weapons System", specifically: submit bi-weekly reports of projects for Government of Iraq review, and update project data in the Iraq Reconstruction Management System on a weekly basis to ensure synchronization of projects among the Government of Iraq ministries.

## **Management Comments**

SIGIR received informal comments on a draft of this report from the Multi-National Forces-Iraq, advising that the Multi-National Forces-Iraq concurred with the report's findings and recommendations.

## **Evaluation of Management Comments**

SIGIR appreciates the informal concurrence by the Multi-National Forces-Iraq with the draft report's recommendations. However, SIGIR requests that management provide formal comments that conform to the requirements of DoD Directive 7650.3. If possible, please send management comments in electronic format (Adobe Acrobat file only) to [brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil](mailto:brian.flynn@iraq.centcom.mil). Copies of the management comments must contain the actual signature of the authorizing official. We cannot accept the / Signed / symbol in place of the actual signature.

## **Appendix A. Scope and Methodology**

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SIGIR performed this project assessment from August through October 2008 in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team comprised an engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

In performing this Project Assessment SIGIR:

- Reviewed contract documentation to include the following: bill of quantities, staffing form, legal review documents, purchase requests and commitments, notice to proceed, refurbishment justification, sole source justifications, terms of agreements, project location, and the project coordination agreement in Arabic;
- Reviewed the design packages (scopes of work) and MNF-I's photographs documenting the construction progress at the schools - 13 photographs for Al Quds School, 53 photographs for Al Mualameen School, and 23 photographs for Al Faoo School;
- Conducted a site visit on 17 September 2008; and
- Conducted briefings with the Multi-National Corps-Iraq on 30 August 2008 and on 30 September 2008.

## **Appendix B. Acronyms**

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CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
GOI	Government of Iraq
I-CERP	Iraqi Commander's Emergency Response Program
kVa	kilovolt amps
MNC-I	Multi-National Corps – Iraq
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SOW	Statement of Work

## **Appendix C. Report Distribution**

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### **Department of State**

Secretary of State

Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq

Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for  
International Development

Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction

Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer,  
Bureau of Resource Management

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq

Director, Iraq Transition Assistance Office

Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development

Inspector General, Department of State

### **Department of Defense**

Secretary of Defense

Deputy Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Chief Financial Officer

Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International  
Security Affairs

Inspector General, Department of Defense

Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency

Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service

Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

### **Department of the Army**

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology

Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,  
Logistics, and Technology

Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)

Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan

Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller

Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Commanding General, Gulf Region Division

Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

Auditor General of the Army

### **U.S. Central Command**

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq

Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central

## **Other Federal Government Organizations**

Director, Office of Management and Budget  
Comptroller General of the United States  
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury  
Inspector General, Department of Commerce  
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services  
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development  
President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation  
President, U.S. Institute for Peace

## **Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member**

### **U.S. Senate**

Senate Committee on Appropriations  
    Subcommittee on Defense  
    Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs  
Senate Committee on Armed Services  
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations  
    Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection  
    Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and Human Rights  
    Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs  
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs  
    Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and International Security  
    Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia  
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

### **U.S. House of Representatives**

House Committee on Appropriations  
    Subcommittee on Defense  
    Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs  
House Committee on Armed Services  
    Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations  
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform  
    Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement  
    Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
    Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight  
    Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia



## Appendix D. Management Comments

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-----Original Message-----

From: McClannan, Doug Mr. CTR [mailto:mcclank@centcom.mil]  
Sent: Tuesday, October 21, 2008 1:23 PM  
To: Johnston, Angelina D CIV SIGIR; Flynn, Brian M CIV SIGIR  
Cc: Davis, Steven A LTC (USA); Rackley, Duane T Mr DoD; Van Dyke, Mr Norvel M (CTR)  
Subject: SIGIR Draft Report PA-08-143 Sadr City Water Treatment Plant; SIGIR Draft Report PA-08-149/150/151 Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools under the Iraq Commander's Emergency Response Program, Baghdad, Iraq

Attached are replies to your request for a review of these SIGIR draft reports.

The attachments come from MNF-I, approved by COL Shumway.

Release from CENTCOM approved by Mr. Rackley, CENTCOM Deputy IG.

R/

Doug McClannan  
CENTCOM IG Assessments  
DoD Contractor  
Northrop Grumman-Technical Services  
DSN 651-6 <<TAB A - CT-3276.docx>> 6 <<SIGIR Sadr R3 rpt comments GRD Water Oct 08.docx>> 60 813-827-6660

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**MNF-I RESPONSE TO 20081014-004 (MNF-I CT-3277)**  
**SIGIR DRAFT REPORT – DATED October 12, 2008 SIGIR PA-08-149/150/151. “Al Quds, Al Mualameen, and Al Faoo Schools under the Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program Baghdad, Iraq”.**

**BACKGROUND:** The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is assessing projects funded under the Iraq-Commander’s Emergency Response Program to provide real-time relief and reconstruction information to interested parties to enable appropriate action, when warranted.

**QUESTION:** To obtain MNF-I command comments on SIGIR draft report. Use attached comment matrix for your replies.

**MNF-I RESPONSE:** MNF-I responds with the following:  
**CONCUR**

## **Appendix E. Project Assessment Team Members**

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The principal staff members who contributed to the report were:

Angelina Johnston

Todd Criswell, P.E.

Shawn Sassaman, P.E.